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REAL PROPERTY: TITLE AND OWNERSHIP
PROBLEMS AND PURCHASES AND SALES
by
Ernest L. Duncan, Jr. *
I. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS
A. Title Disputes
Adverse Possession. A number of cases reported during the survey pe-
riod involved claims of ownership of land based on adverse possession,
under the statutes of limitation applicable to actions for the recovery of
lands.2 In Ellis v. Jansing3 plaintiffs sought to establish title to a strip of
land, a portion of which previously had been dedicated by plaintiffs' and
defendants' common source of title to the City of Waco and the general
public for use as an alley. Defendants claimed title to the disputed tract
under the ten-year statute of limitations.4 Plaintiffs and defendants did not
dispute the fact that title was subject to the public easement. 5 The trial
court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.6 The Waco court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial on the merits, 7 rejecting
defendants' claim that an action to establish title by limitation to land
dedicated to public use was barred under article 5517.8 The court rea-
• J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Barnhart, Mallia, Cochran & Luther,
Corpus Christi, Texas.
1. Adverse possession is defined in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (Vernon
1958) as "an actual and visible a pro nation of the land, commenced and continued under
a claim of right inconsistent wit? and hostile to the claim of another."
2. Texas has six limitations statutes that vest title to realty by adverse possession. TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5519a (Vernon 1958), & arts. 5518, 5519
(Vernon Supp. 1982). The limitation period is either three, five, ten or twenty-five years
depending on the circumstances. In some instances the record owner will be barred from
suit despite the presence of legal disabilities during the limitation period. Id arts. 518-
5519a. See generally Larson, Limitations on Actionsfor Real Property.- The Texas Five- Year
Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385 (1964); Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes,
15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961); Note, Adverse Possession.- The Three, Five and Ten Year Statutes of
Limitation, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 78 (1975).
3. 620 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1981).
4. Jansing v. Ellis, 610 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980), rev'd, 620
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1981); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958) (providing
for 10 year limitations period).
5. 610 S.W.2d at 814.
6. Id. at 813.
7. Id at 815.
8. Id TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5517 (Vernon 1958) provides:
The right of the State, all counties, incorporated cities and all school dis-
tricts shall not be barred by any of the provisions of this Title, nor shall any
person ever acquire, by occupancy or adverse possession, any right or title to
any part or portion of any road, street, alley, sidewalk, or grounds which be-
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soned that article 5517 was designed to protect the rights of the city and the
general public against limitation claimants, and therefore, had no applica-
bility in a dispute between private parties claiming fee simple title to land
subject to a public easement.9 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment. 10 The court held that article 5517 was applicable in this case to
protect the rights of the persons to whom the easement was dedicated and
thereby prevent any claim of adverse possession with respect to the ease-
ment.l' Additionally, the court held that defendants had failed to present
evidence of a title by limitation to the remaining portion of the disputed
tract.' 2 The court noted that to establish title under the ten year statute, 13
the defendants would have to tack their period of adverse possession, if
any, to that of their grantor.' 4 The grantor testified by deposition that al-
though he had bought the property thinking that the land in dispute was
within his boundary and that he thereafter maintained it as part of his
yard, he had never claimed or intended to claim any property other than
that described in his deed, or what he thought was contained in his deed. 15
The court relied on Wright v. Vernon Compress Co. 16 and Orsborn v. Deep
Rock Oil Co. 17 in holding that mere occupancy or naked possession of
land, no matter how exclusive and hostile to the true owner it may appear,
cannot be adverse unless accompanied by the occupant's intent to make it
so.' 8 Because the defendants' grantor did not have the requisite intent, his
possession was not adverse and the defendants could not tack his period of
possession to theirs to meet the requisite ten year period.19
In Field Measurement Service, Inc. v. Ives 20 the Corpus Christi court of
civil appeals held that a deed allegedly obtained by fraud conveyed legal
title to the grantees because the deed was not void on its face.21 When
long to any town, city, or county, or which have been donated or dedicated for
public use. to any such town, city, or county by the owner thereof, or which
have been laid out or dedicated in any manner to public use in any town, city,
or county in this State.
9. 610 S.W.2d at 814-15.
10. 620 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. 1981).
11. Id at 570.
12. Id at 571.
13. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
14. 620 S.W.2d at 571.
15. Id
16. 156 Tex. 474, 482, 296 S.W.2d 517, 522 (1957). "Mere occupancy of land without
any intention to appropriate it will not support the statute of limitation.'
17. 153 Tex. 281, 291, 267 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1954) (quoting Houston Oil Co. v. Stepney,
187 S.W. 1078, 1084: "No matter how exclusive and hostile to the true owner the possession
may be in appearance, it cannot be adverse unless accompanied by the intent on the part of
the occupant to make it so. The naked possession unaccompanied with any claim of righit
will never constitute a bar.").
18. 620 S.W.2d at 571-72.
19. Id
20. 609 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. Id at 619-21. Plaintiff was barred from establishing that the deed was fraudulently
executed because the action was not brought within the limitation period prescribed by TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526, 5529 (Vernon 1958). 609 S.W.2d at 619. In Neal v. Pick-
ett, 280 S.W. 748 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgment adopted), the court held that under
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coupled with the jury's finding of three years of continuous, adverse pos-
session by the defendant, who had purchased from the grantees named in
that deed, the legal title so conveyed was held sufficient to vest title in the
defendant under the three-year statute of limitations. 22 Quitclaim deeds,
however, were held insufficient to support a claim of title under the five-
year statute of limitations23 in Bell v. Ott.24 The court relied on Porter v.
Wilson 25 in holding that a quitclaim deed does not qualify as a deed under
the five-year statute because it does not purport to convey the land itself,
but instead an undefined and uncertain interest in the land.26 Because a
quitclaim does not give any notice of the nature and extent of the claim
which it asserts it cannot qualify as a deed under the five-year statute.27
Several cases dealt with questions involving fences and use of the en-
closed land. In Rudy v. Hardy28 the Waco court of civil appeals found the
evidence supported the jury finding of peaceable, and adverse possession
for a period of ten consecutive years, so as to establish a limitation title
under the ten-year statute.29 The forty acres in dispute were part of a tract
the three-year statute of limitation, neither "title" nor "color of title" can be obtained from a
deed procurred by fraud so as to establish a limitation title because of the lack of intrinsic
fairness and honesty in such a conveyance. A duly recorded fraudulently obtained deed,
however, was a sufficient muniment of title such that adverse possession could be established
under the five-year statute, presently TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (Vernon 1958).
280 S.W. at 752. In Field Measurement the adverse possessor had been in possession in
excess of five years prior to commencement of the suit. 609 S.W.2d at 618. The case does
not reveal whether the fraudulent deed had been recorded and the court made no mention
of the five-year statute or the decision in Neal v. Pickett; thus the existence of a limitation
title was decided solely under the three-year statute. In Hoester v. Wilke, 138 Tex. 263, 158
S.W.2d 288 (1942), the Texas Supreme Court held that an allegedly fraudulent deed, regular
on its face so as to give rise to no suggestion of fraud, could be used to establish color of title
under the three-year statute when it had not been established prior to the expiration of the
three-year period that the deed was in fact fraudulent, even though the cause of action for
fraud was not barred at the time. Id at 265-66, 158 S.W.2d at 289-90.
22. 609 S.W.2d at 620-21. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5507 (Vernon 1958):
"Suits to recover real estate, as against a person in peaceable and adverse possession thereof
under title or color of title, shall be instituted within three years next after the cause of action
accrued, and not afterword."
23. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (Vernon 1958). Article 5509 provides in part:
Every suit to recover real estate as against a person having peaceable and
adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, and paying.
taxes thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered, shall
be instituted within five years next after cause of action shall have accrued,
and not afterward.
24. 606 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
25. 389 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1965). Accord, Rosborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 19 S.W.
131.(1917).
26. 606 S.W.2d at 952.
27. Id The court also held that claims made under the ten-year statute, TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958), were not conclusively established by the evidence. 606
S.W.2d at 952.
28. 610 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
29. Id at 567. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958). Article 5510
provides in part:
Any person who has the right of action for the recovery of lands, tenements
or hereditaments against another having peaceable and adverse possession
thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, shall institute a suit therefor
within ten years next after his cause.
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of land claimed by the defendants that had been enclosed within a sub-
stantial fence built by the defendants' father in 1951 or 1952, and which
the defendants thereafter had maintained. 30 The defendants had grazed
cattle continuously within the enclosure, had bulldozed the property once
to remove timber on the land, had cultivated a crop for two years, and had
the brush cut twice during that period. According to several witnesses, the
defendants claimed and used all of the land within the enclosure. 31 In
Karell v. West 32 the defendants claimed title to a parcel of land adjoining
land owned by the defendants. Both tracts of land were enclosed within
the same fence, which was in existence when the defendants bought their
acreage. 33 The court held that enclosure of the land gives rise to a rebutta-
ble presumption of an adverse claim by the party in possession, but that
presumption was diluted in this case by the fact that the fence was not
erected designedly by the defendants. 34 The court held that the defendants
failed to prove continuous use or enjoyment of the land because they had
never lived on or cultivated the land, and there was no evidence of contin-
ued use by them or their tenants for any ten year period in any manner
that would have put the record owner or notice of their claim.35 In
Delrman v. Surs 36 a fence, erroneously believed by all parties to be situ-
ated on the boundary lines of their respective properties, which had been
in existence and maintained for more than fifty years, 37 was held to be
strictly a casual fence that under the statutes of limitations had "no more
effect than if it had never come into existence."' 38 With no evidence intro-
duced as to when, or by whom, or for what purpose the fence was origi-
nally built, the fence alone could not establish the existence of an intent to
adversely possess the land in question.39 Additionally, entry upon the land
by straying cattle, the occasional cutting of wood, and the use of an ex-
isting roadway on the disputed area were held insufficient to prove adverse
possession as defined by article 5515.41
Several cases reported during the survey period dealt with sufficiency of
notice of repudiation in order to commence adverse possession in favor of
a tenant. Possession by a tenant pursuant to a landlord-tenant relationship
30. The action in trespass to try title was brought by the record owner in 1974. The
defendants asserted adverse possession as a defense, claiming continuous use and enjoyment
since 1951. 610 S.W.2d at 566.
31. 610 S.W.2d at 567.
32. 616 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (per curiam).
33. Id at 694-95.
34. Id at 696. See McKee v. Stewart, 139 Tex. 260, 268, 162 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1942, opinion adopted).
35. 616 S.W.2d at 696. While the court referred to no particular statute of limitations,
the facts demonstrate that the claim of adverse possession was made under the ten-year
statute. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
36. 618 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Id at 91.
38. Id (quoting West. Prod. Co. v. Kahawek, 132 Tex. 153, 158, 121 S.W.2d 328, 331
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1938, opinion adopted).
39. See 618 S.W.2d at 91.
40. Id at 92-93.
41. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (Vernon 1958).
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will not be considered adverse to the record owner until the tenant repudi-
ates the tenancy and the owner receives actual or constructive notice of the
repudiation. 42 In Junkerman v. Carruth43 the plaintiff had gone into pos-
session in 1935 as a tenant under an agreement with the defendant's prede-
cessor in title which permitted the tenant to farm the tract in dispute in
return for keeping the surface taxes paid. After forty-two years of continu-
ous possession of the twenty acre tract, the tenant brought suit in trespass
to try title. The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals found that the jury
could have reasonably inferred that the owner was aware of the tenant's
repudiation of the tenancy relationship because the tenant sent a letter to
the owner in 1960 stating that his son wanted to build a home on the tract,
but that to do so, they needed a deed.44 The owner's reply letter dated
almost two years later: "I have been advised by a lawyer that you were
trying to get a title to this land. '45 In Horrocks v. Horrocks46 and Her-
nandez v. Hernandez47 parties who were co-tenants were held not to have
brought home notice of repudiation to their co-tenants against whom they
allegedly claimed adversely.48 In each case the court relied on a long line
of cases including Todd v. Bruner 9 and Alexander v. Kennedy5" in holding
that possession of land by one co-tenant is presumed to be in recognition
of the common title until notice of adverse possession is brought home to
the co-tenants not in possession, either by notice given by the co-tenant in
possession, or by unequivocal and unmistakable acts of notoriety, that an
adverse and hostile claim is being asserted such that the non-possessing co-
tenants will be presumed to have notice of the adverse claim. 5'
Easements. InAllen v. Keeling52 the plaintiffs and defendants owned adja-
cent tracts of land. The defendants had sought to connect a road from a
residential subdivision on their land to an undedicated dirt roadway on the
plaintiffs' land, over which an undisputed prescriptive easement existed in
favor of the public. The Texas Supreme Court held that the proscriptive
rights acquired by the public in the roadway were not limited to the road-
way itself, but also extended to land reasonably needed for repairs, drain-
age ditches, and the convenience of travelers.53 In this case, the
prescriptive easement extended into the "bar" ditches eighteen to twenty
42. See, e.g., Tex.-Wis. Co. v. Johnson, 53 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. 1976); Killough v.
Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 710-11 (1960).
43. 620 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
44. Id at 168. The letter was sent to the owner in Ohio; in it, the tenant stated that he
had not heard from the owner since 1936. In the owner's reply letter, dated two years after
the tenant's letter, he stated that he was living in Florida. Id at 167.
45. Id at 167-68.
46. 608 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
47. 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
48. 608 S.W.2d at 737; 611 S.W.2d at 736.
49. 365 S.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Tex. 1963).
50. 19 Tex. 488, 492-93 (1857).
51. See 608 S.W.2d at 736-37; 611 S.W.2d at 735.
52. 613 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1981).
53. Id at 25-55.
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feet in width lying on either side of the roadway. The prescriptive ease-
ment did not, however, reach all the way to the boundary of the defend-
ants' land because a narrow strip of land separated the outer edge of the
"bar" ditch on the south side of the roadway from plaintiffs' fence, which
itself was located approximately two and one-half feet inside the record
title line to the plaintiffs' land. Relying on Brooks v. Jones,54 the court
held that a landowner must be adjacent to an easement to acquire rights in
the easement. 5  Because the plaintiffs' land was not adjacent to the pre-
scriptive easement, the defendants were held not to have a justiciable inter-
est in the roadway and were enjoined from trespassing on the plaintiffs'
land.5 6
In Beck v. Mills57 the parents of the parties had given them adjacent
tracts of land. Access to the plaintiff's land was provided by a road
through the defendant's land. The road had been in continuous use for
more than forty years and was well-defined and conspicuous. In a suit for
an injunction to compel the defendant to remove a lock on a gate blocking
the road, the defendant argued that the only easement which could exist
was one created by an implied reservation and not by an implied grant,
thereby requiring a finding of strict necessity rather than the standard of
reasonable necessity applicable to implied grants.58 The court disagreed,
holding that where the gifts partitioning the tracts were made simultane-
ously, and the roadway was in existence, was in apparent, continuous use,
and was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part of the land to
which it provided access, each party took his part of the land subject to the
roadway as it existed at the time of conveyance. 59 The plaintiff therefore
took by implied grant and the defendant took subject to the grant; as such,
reasonable necessity was the appropriate standard. 60
In Meredith v. Eddy6l the trial court found that the plaintiffs, who had
purchased a landlocked tract to which access was provided by a road over
land belonging to the vendors at the time of purchase, were entitled to an
easement under four theories: easement by prescription, easement by es-
toppel, easement by implication and easement by necessity. 62 In affirming
54. 578 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. 1979). In Brooks the plaintiff attempted to establish his
right to use a dedicated road located wholly on defendant's land on a theory of public dedi-
cation. The court held that while public dedications are enforceable by private landowners
with a property interest therein, the plaintiff had no justiciable interest in the road because
his land was not adjacent to the road.
55. 613 S.W.2d at 255.
56. Id at 254-55.
57. 616 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd).
58. Id at 355. See general y Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163 (1952).
Implied grants and implied reservations arise when the owner of a single parcel of land
conveys away a portion of it under such circumstances causing an easement to arise between
the two estates. If the easement favors the parcel granted, an implied grant is created. If the
easement favors the parcel retained by the grantor, an implied reservation is created. 151
Tex. at 64-65, 246 S.W.2d at 167.
59. 616 S.W.2d at 355.
60. Id
61. 616 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
62. Id at 238.
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the judgment for plaintiff, the court of civil appeals held that there was no
evidence of adverse holding of the road that would give rise to a prescrip-
tive easement because of the testimony of one of the plaintiffs showing
permission by the owner to use the road. 63 The court, however, held there
was sufficient evidence to support the requirements of an easement by es-
toppel, which are that (1) a representation be made to the promisee, (2) it is
believed by the promisee, and (3) he relies upon the representation. 64
There also was sufficient evidence to prove the requirements of an ease-
ment by implication, that (1) there be an apparent use, i.e. a road into or
out of the granted area in existence at the time of the grant, (2) the use be
continuous, and (3) the use be necessary.65 On the issue of easement by
necessity, to which the defendants conceded the plaintiffs were entitled
when they purchased their land, the defendants argued that there was no
longer a necessity to use the original route of the easement along the old
road because defendants had recently built a new road for them.66 The
court rejected this argument, holding that once the easement by necessity
was established, its location could not be changed except by the express or
implied consent of both parties. 67
Dedication. Two cases reported during the survey period dealt with issues
of common law dedication of roadways. In Stewart v. Fitts68 a fourteen
year old boy ran his dirt bike into a barbed strand which was located on a
strip of land which allegedly had been dedicated as a public road by de-
fendants. In a suit filed on behalf of the boy, plaintiffs contended that
defendants were negligent for barricading a public road.69 In affirming a
take nothing judgment for defendants, the El Paso court of appeals re-
jected plaintiff's contention that the land in question had been dedicated
for public use at common law. 70 Although defendants had filed a dedica-
tion deed for record in the deed records of the county (which was never
presented to or formally or informally accepted by the governing bodies of
either the city or the county), the court held that there was insufficient
evidence to indicate that the offer of dedication by the deed had been ac-
cepted by the public through actual use. 71 Lee v. Uvalde County 72 dealt
63. Id An essential element in the creation of a prescriptive easement is the use of the
easement in a manner adverse to the holder of the land. See, e.g., Othen v. Rosier, 148 Tex.
485, 226 S.W.2d 622 (1950).
64. 616 S.W.2d at 238-39. See Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 207
(Tex. 1962).
65. 616 S.W.2d at 240.
66. Id An easement by necessity ceases to exist when the necessity terminates. E.g.,
Bains v. Parker, 143 Tex. 57, 61, 182 S.W.2d 397, 399 (1944). In Meredith the Court held
that necessity was still present because the plaintiffs still needed a way of ingress and egress
to their land. 616 S.W.2d at 240.
67. 616 S.W.2d at 240. See Grobe v. Ottmeis, 22 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1949, writ refd n.r.e.); Carelton v. Dierks, 203 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. 604 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. Id at 373.
70. Id at 373-74.
71. Id at 373.
19821
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with the issue of implied dedication, the elements of which were stated to
include: (1) a person competent to dedicate, (2) a public purpose to be
served by the dedication, (3) a tender or offer of dedication, and (4) accept-
ance of the tender or offer.73 The court held that the intent element must
be shown by an unequivocal act or declaration of the owner.74 In Lee
acquiescense by the landowners to the maintenance of roads by the county
was held insufficient to establish an intent to dedicate or to estop the land-
owners from denying an intention to dedicate the roads. 75 The court also
noted that because the road was used only by the landowners in the area,
rather than by the public in general, no dedication had arisen by use of the
road by such a limited segment of the public. 76
In City of Fort Worth v. Bewley77 the court dealt with an 1873 dedication
of a tract of land in downtown Fort Worth for park purposes. In 1892, the
dedicator gave her permission to use the tract for a public library. Because
fee title to the property had not been conveyed by the dedication, the suc-
cessors of the original dedicator were held to be entitled to recover the land
when the library was moved to a new location in 1978.78
Equitable Claims. Several cases during the survey period involved the re-
covery of interests in real property based upon equitable claims. In Crume
v. Smith 79 plaintiffs sought partition of land that had been owned jointly
by four daughters (plaintiffs' predecessors), a brother (defendants' prede-
cessor), and their mother. The original owners had conveyed a portion of
the land to a vendee by a general warranty deed that expressly retained a
vendor's lien securing payment of purchase money notes payable to the
mother only. When the vendee was unable to pay the notes he reconveyed
the land to the mother and brother only, thereby depriving the daughters
of legal title. The court held that because the daughters had furnished a
portion of consideration for the notes, a resulting trust arose in their favor,
although the mother as payee held legal title to the notes.80 Thus, the
daughters were entitled to the same benefit enjoyed by the mother of the
superior title in the land which was retained by virtue of the reservation of
the vendor's lien in the deed.8' Because of this superior title, neither the
vendee nor his successors in interests could assert title against the vendor
until the purchase money notes were paid, which they were not.8 2 Accord-
72. 616 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
73. Id at 371.
74. Id
75. Id at 372.
76. Id
77. 612 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. Id at 261.
79. 620 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
80. Id at 215. A theory of resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine of consider-
ation. The trust arises when a party furnishes valuable consideration in exchange for prop-
erty but does not take legal title to the property. See, e.g., Cohrs v. Scott, 161 Tex. 111, 117,
338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (1960).
81. See generally 58 TEx. JUR. 2d Vendor & Purchaser § 262 (1964).
82. 620 S.W.2d at 215.
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ingly, the plaintiffs, who were the heirs of the four daughters, were entitled
to reclaim their interests from the heirs of the brother because any title the
brother's heirs held by virtue of the reconveyance was inferior to that of
the daughters. 83 Additionally, the court found ample evidence that the
mother was acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to her daughters'
interest during the transactions, and therefore, their interests also were
protected by a constructive trust imposed by the court.84
Uriarte v. Petro85 involved a transfer of $15,000 in cash and the execu-
tion of a deed to real property by a woman to her sister. The property was
to be used to care for the grantor who was seriously ill at the time of the
transfers. After the transferor's death, her husband sued to recover the
remaining assets, including the proceeds from the sale of the real property.
The jury found that the wife had not made a gift of the money or the realty
to her sister.86 The trial court made a finding of fact that although consid-
eration was recited in the deed, no consideration was given or received. 87
The court of civil appeals held that a resulting trust in favor of the hus-
band arose from the transaction because the transfer was not a gift and
was without consideration. 88 Because the transfer was entered into for the
one specific purpose of benefiting the transferor, after that purpose was
fulfilled the remainder reverted to her estate and consequently to her hus-
band as her heir. 89 In Turner v. Miller90 plaintiff, guardian of an elderly
woman sought to have the court set aside deeds that were executed by the
woman to defendants, who after her son's death had befriended her and
permitted a close family-like relationship between them to arise. The trial
court made an implied finding that a fiduciary relationship had arisen be-
tween defendants and the woman.9' The appellate court noted that the
existence of a fiduciary relationship placed the burden of proof upon the
defendants to show the fairness of the transaction and that the trial court
was justified in finding that the presumption of unfairness was not rebut-
ted.92 In Thames v. Johnson93 a fiduciary relationship was held to have
arisen between a father and his daughters by reason of the parent-child
relationship and the daughters' youth at the time of the death of their
mother in 1960. The daughters instituted suit to recover damages for fraud
83. Id
84. Id at 215-16. A court may impose a constructive trust on property to prevent a
fiduciary from holding for his own benefit something of value gained by reason of the fiduci-
ary relationship. See, e.g., Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 48-53, 237 S.W.2d 256, 261-64
(195 1). In Horton v. Harris, 610 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.)
the court refused to impose a constructive trust when the evidence did not indicate the pres-
ence of fraud or a confidential relationship. ld at 823-25.
85. 606 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. Id at 25.
87. Id
88. Id at 215.
89. Id
90. 618 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
91. Id at 87. See Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Tex. 1980).
92. Id
93. 614 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
arising out of the sale by the father of land in which the daughters had
inherited an undivided one-half interest from their mother. In affirming
the decision of the trial court in favor of the daughters, the court of civil
appeals held that the father's failure to advise the purchaser or the title
company of the daughters' interest in the land, to which legal title was in
the father's name only, constituted constructive fraud.94 The court held
that the daughters were not estopped to assert their interest in the land on
the basis that they had not contributed their fair share to the maintenance
and taxes assessed on the land because the co-tenant relationship existing
between the father and his daughters was not between parties dealing at
arm's length.95
Conveyances. In Bexar-Medina Atascosa Counties Water Improvement Dis-
trict No. 1 v. Wallace96 the plaintiff water district sought to enjoin con-
struction of a septic tank on land which it claimed under a 1917 deed. The
deed described three tracts of land as beginning from points designated as
points "1", "2" and "Y respectively, but the deed was silent concerning
the location of those points or reference to another instrument from which
their location could be determined. The court held that while parol evi-
dence is admissible to explain descriptive words and identify the land
when the instrument itself contains a "nucleus of description," to be ad-
missible the parol testimony must be directly connected to the descriptive
data.97 Because the 1917 deed did not contain sufficient information to
locate the land, the court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's holding
that the deed was void.98
Yoast v. Yoast 99 involved a dispute over three separate gift deeds to the
plaintiff and his brother from their parents. Each deed purported to con-
vey to each of them a 1/ 13 undivided interest in a 442.94 acre tract of land.
Before the execution of any of the gift deeds, the plaintiff had perfected
title by limitation to a 160 acre tract contained within the 442.94 acres. In
a suit for trespass to try title and partition, the trial court awarded the
plaintiff the 160 acre tract by limitations and 102.45 acres, representing
3/13 of the original acreage, under the three gift conveyances. I°° The
court of civil appeals held that, because limitations title to the 160 acre
tract had been perfected before execution of the gift deeds, there was a
partial failure of title with respect to the 3/13 interest that the deeds pur-
ported to convey in the 160 acres.101 The extent of the undivided interest
transferred, therefore, was to be based only upon 282.94 acres, the number
94. See id at 614.
95. Id
96. 619 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. Id at 555. See Jones v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 163 Tex. 229, 231, 356 S.W.2d 923,
924-25 (1962); Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 358, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935).
98. 619 S.W.2d at 554, 556.
99. 620 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
100. Id at 230.
101. Id See First Nat'l Bank of Rockport v. Brown, 15 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved).
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of acres remaining in the tract. 0 2 The court then modified the part of the
trial court's judgment granting 102.45 acres to grant recovery of only 55.76
acres by virtue of the gift deeds. 10 3
Trespass to Try Title. Texas courts distinguish between an action of tres-
pass to try title and an action in the nature of trespass to try title.'1 4 Dis-
putes concerning actual title to realty are usually brought as trespass to try
title actions. 0 5 Boundary disputes typically are tried as actions in the na-
ture of trespass to try title.'0 6 In a trespass to try title action, a litigant
must prove that title is vested in him as against all the world, but in an
action in the nature of trespass to try title, theitigant need only prove that
his title to the land is superior to that of the adverse party.10 7
Plumb v. Stuessy108 involved a thirty-foot wide strip of land a mile and a
half in length, consisting of two tracts acquired by the plaintiffs' predeces-
sor in title in 1899 and 1900 and which provided access from the highway
to the plaintiffs' ranch. After a dispute with a neighbor whose land ad-
joined the strip, the plaintiffs brought a trespass to try title action claiming
ownership of the two tracts and any other land in the lane between the two
fences bordering the strip.'0 9 The trial court applied the rules for trial of a
formal trespass to try title action and granted a directed verdict at the close
of plaintiffs' evidence, rendering a judgment for the defendant which de-
prived the plaintiffs of their title to the two tracts and denied their adverse
102. 620 S.W.2d at 230.
103. Id The court stated:
We have arrived at this figure in the following manner: in 1965, when the first
gift deed was executed, [the parents] owned 282.94 acres, out of which the
conveyed an undivided 1/13 interest to both [plaintiff] and [his brother] (21.76
acres each) leaving 239.42 acres; a second conveyance of and undivided 1/13
interest was made in 1966 to the sons in 1966 [sic] out of the remaining 239.42
acres of 18.42 acres each; in 1967 a final 1/13 undivided interest was conveyed
to [the sons] out of the remaining 202.58 acres, thus entitling each of them to
an additional 15.58 acres and a total of 55.76 acres.
Id The court correctly held that the acreage from which the plaintiffs 3/13 undivided inter-
est was calculated as 282.94 rather than 442.94 acres because of the failure of title to the 160
acre tract that plaintiff acquired by limitations. Whether the court was correct in reducing
the acreage base for calculating the 1/13 interests conveyed by each successive deed is an-
other matter. Arguably, the proper approach would have been to construe each of the gifts
deeds as a full 1/13 interest in the 282.94 acres for a total of 65.29 acres each rather than the
55.76 acres awarded to each grantee.
104. See, e.g., Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Lee v. Grupe, 223 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no writ).
105. See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 136 Tex. 5, 133 S.W.2d 767 (1939).
106. See, e.g., Hayes v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 62 Tex. 397 (1884).
107. Rocha v. Campos, 574 S.W.2d 233, 235-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ). See also Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
ref d n.r.e.). In Hancock v. Booker, 608 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)
the court held that the effect of a take nothing judgment rendered against the plaintiff in a
trespass to try title action was to vest title to the realty in the defendant. Id at 816. See also
Hejlv. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609, 610, 343 S.W.2d 226, 226 (1961); French v. Olive, 67 Tex. 400,
402, 35 S.W.2d 568, 569 (1887).
108. 617 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1981).
109. See id at 668. For the various theories that may be used to recover in trespass to try
title, see Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1964).
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possession claim to any other land in the lane." 0 The court of civil ap-
peals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish title from
the sovereignty, from a common source, or by limitation, and that they had
waived the issue of prior possession."' The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the petition
asserted more than a pure trespass to try title action." 2 The court con-
cluded that the action was a boundary case, because the plaintiffs' title was
not disputed, despite the defendants' formal "not guilty" plea, and the de-
fendant's theory of the case that a fence was not the correct boundary and
thus encroached on his land. 1 3 Holding that the proper test is that a case
is one of boundary where there would have been no case but for the ques-
tion of boundary, even though it may involve questions of title,"14 the
court concluded that the case was a boundary case, and that it was not
necessary for plaintiffs to establish superior title in the manner required by
a formal trespass to try title action to avoid losing title to the property." 15
McCarthy v. George" 6 was a trespass to try title suit in which the trial
court ordered an absent co-tenant joined as an involuntary plaintiff.' ' 7
The court of civil appeals held the absent co-tenant to be an indispensable
party whose absence deprived the court of jurisdiction.' 8 In a per curiam
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
court of civil appeals to consider other points of error raised but not de-
cided, holding that under Rule 39' 19 the absent co-tenant was not jurisdic-
tionally indispensable where the case had been tried as to the parties
present without objection at the trial level concerning nonjoinder of a
party. 120
Aquirre v. Mayfield!2' was a suit for injunction to prohibit an adjoining
landowner from constructing a new boundary fence that would result in
the defendant's taking possession of approximately 2,000 acres previously
claimed by the plaintiff. The court held that the trial court could not grant
an injunction that prevented a change in the supposed boundary and
thereby awarded possession to a party in the absence of a pleading assert-
ing a cause of action in trespass to try title.122
110. 603 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980).
111. Id. at 354-55.
112. 617 S.W.2d at 668-69.
113. Id See TEX. R. Civ. P. 788. See generally 56 TEX. JUR. 2d Trespass to Try Title
§ 92 (1964).
114. Id at 669. See Schiele v. Kimball, 113 Tex. 1, 3, 194 S.W.2d 944, 944 (1917).
115. Id
116. 618 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1981).
117. Id at 762.
118. 609 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980).
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39.
120. 618 S.W.2d at 763. But see Carper v. Halamicek, 610 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which holds that in a suit for partition joinder of all co-tenants
is mandatory. Id at 557.
121. 610 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
122. Id at 167-68. See also Frost v. Mischer, 463 S.W.2d 166, 167-69 (Tex. 1971).
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Other Title Problems. In Jensen v. Bryson 123 Bryson went into possession
of the subject land about the first of July 1979 under a written contract for
conveyance to her upon payment of the cash portion of the purchase price
and the assumption of other indebtedness against the land. Bryson had
performed her contractual obligations fully to December 10, 1977, but the
seller could not be located to execute a deed until July 14, 1980. The war-
ranty deed was recorded on August 27, 1980. Meanwhile, Jensen had ob-
tained a judgment against the seller, an abstract of which was recorded on
April 29, 1980. Execution of that judgment was levied on the realty in late
June, with a sheriffs sale to occur on September 2, 1980. In a suit by Mrs.
Bryson to enjoin the sheriffs sale, the court considered the effect of article
6627124 and held that it only operates on a writing passing title to land and
not on an unrecordable interest that arises by operation of law.' 25 The
parties' contract, therefore, was not governed by article 6627. It was not a
"bargain, sale or other conveyance" because it merely outlined the agreed
conditions for passage of title in the future.126 Bryson's rights were held to
be superior to Jensen's judgment lien for two reasons. First, upon full
performance of her obligations under the contract, she became vested with
equitable title, superior to the seller's legal title. This equitable title was
not subject to registration and, therefore, did not come within article 6627
with respect to the rights of creditors.' 27 Second, her possession of the
land was held to impart notice of her equitable title, and therefore Jensen
did not qualify as a creditor without notice under the statute.
28
B. Ownership Problems
Use Restrictions. The validity of restrictive covenants which require sub-
mission of plans to, and consent by, the developer or an architectural con-
trol committee before construction of improvements was at issue in Davis
v. Huey.' 29 The case involved restrictions that had been imposed on a
subdivision prior to the sale of any lots. Paragraph 7 of the recorded dec-
laration of restrictive covenants provided for minimum set-back require-
ments from the front, side, and rear lot lines, while Paragraph 8 of the
declaration required the approval of all construction plans by the devel-
oper or an architectural committee before construction could commence.
Paragraph 8 provided that refusal of approval could "be based on any
123. 614 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
All bargains, sales and other conveyances whatever, of any land, tenements
and hereditaments, whether they be made for passing any estate of freehold of
inheritance or for a term of years . . . shall be void as to all creditors and
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless they
shall be acknowledged or proved and filed with the clerk, to be recorded as
required by law ....
125. 614 S.W.2d at 933.
126. Id.
127. Id See Blankenship v. Douglas, 26 Tex. 226, 229 (1862).
128. Id See Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 111, 105 S.W.2d 174, 175 (1907).
129. 620 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1981).
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ground, including purely aesthetic grounds, which in the sole and uncon-
trolled discretion of the Developer or Architectural Committee shall seem
sufficient."' 30 Relying upon the broad authority permitting refusal con-
ferred by Paragraph 8, the developer refused to approve the defendants'
plans for a house on their lot, which complied with the set-back require-
ments of Paragraph 7 because the proposed placement of the house on the
lot was inconsistent with the general plan of the subdivision. Despite the
developer's refusal to approve the plans, the defendants started construc-
tion. The plaintiffs, owners of a neighboring lot, filed a suit to enjoin the
construction. The trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting
further construction and requiring removal of a part of the house already
construed. The court of civil appeals affirmed.' 3' In reversing the lower
courts, the Texas Supreme Court held that covenants requiring prior con-
sent to proposed building plans are valid "insofar as they furnish adequate
notice to the property owner of the specific restriction sought to be en-
forced." ' 32 The court held that Paragraph 8 failed to provide notice that it
was intended to regulate placement of improvements on individual lots, in
addition to the specific set-back requirements of Paragraph 7, and held
that there was no evidence of a general scheme or plan in that regard at the
time the restrictions were filed in the deed records. Therefore, the defend-
ants had no notice at the time they purchased the lot that Paragraph 8
would be enforced to regulate placement of improvements, so that as a
matter of law Paragraph 8 failed to provide notice of the placement restric-
tions sought to be enforced, and the refusal of the developer to approve the
plans exceeded the authority granted by the covenants and was void. 133
A number of other cases reported during the survey period involve vari-
ous issues pertaining to restrictive covenants. In Brown v. Wehner' 34 the
court applied the rule that a restrictive covenant is to be strictly construed
against the party seeking to enforce 35 it in holding that a restriction
prohibiting any structure on a lot "except one single family residence"
does not prohibit the resubdivision of an original lot into three smaller
lots, all of which meet the minimum side and front set back requirements
of the original restrictions.' 36
Scott v. Rheudasi' 37 was a suit by lot owners to enforce restrictive cove-
nants prohibiting house trailers. The covenants had been filed by the de-
veloper, a corporation which was no longer in existence, and no provision
was made for enforcement by anyone other than the developer and its as-
signs. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the restric-
tions, at least to the extent necessary to obtain a temporary injunction,
130. Id at 563.
131. 608 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980).
132. 620 S.W.2d 566. See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restric-
tions §§ 304-11 (1965).
133. 620 S.W.2d at 567-68.
134. 610 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
135. See, e.g., Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 276, 153 S.W.2d 465, 470 (1941).
136. 610 S.W.2d at 171.
137. 614 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
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because the entity to which the right of enforcement was reserved was de-
funct, all the lots had been sold and the developer had relied on the cove-
nants as a selling point.' 38 The court noted that upon trial on the merits,
the burden would be on the plaintiffs to prove that the covenants were
intended to inure to their benefit and that the defendants had purchased
their lot with notice of that intent.' 39
In Bryant v. Lake Highlands Development Co. 140 the court dealt with a
provision in restrictive covenants that permitted ninety percent of the lot
owners, together with all their first lien holders, to amend the covenants
and restrictions. The amendment in question permitted the development
of fourplex units on lots originally restricted to single family townhouses,
but it did not affect the developed lots, all of which remained subject to the
original restrictions. The court held that, having purchased their lots with
notice of a right to amend the restrictions, the plaintiffs had no guaranty
that the entire subdivision would remain devoted exclusively to single fam-
ily townhouses.' 4 '
Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with attempts to im-
pose existing restrictions on additional property owned by the same devel-
oper. Wren Mortgage Co. v. Timber Lakes & Timber Ridge Association' 42
was a suit for a declaratory judgment that a 31.78 acre tract did not lie
within a subdivision and, therefore, was not burdened with the restrictions
imposed on that subdivision. The court held that a clause in a deed cover-
ing the tract providing that the deed was subject to the restrictions in ques-
tion, and which referred to the appropriate volume and page numbers of
the deed records containing the restrictions, was merely a precautionary
recital to protect the grantor. Thus, the recital in the deed did not burden
the tract with the restrictions.14 3 The court also held that no evidence ex-
isted that the restrictions were imposed by a general plan or scheme of
development, where the restrictions were imposed upon nine different sub-
divisions platted and restricted at different times, and each instrument per-
mitted its restrictions to be changed or abolished by a majority of lot
owners separately from other property owners in other subdivisions. 44
Sills v. Excel Services, Inc. 145 was a suit by homeowners in a subdivision to
enforce single-family residential covenants on a 4.22 acre tract upon which
an apartment complex was to be constructed. When the residential subdi-
vision was platted, the 4.22 acres was shown on the plat labeled as "Future
Development." The court denied a temporary injunction, holding that the
4.22 acre tract labeled for "Future Development" was not within the sub-
138. Id at 629. See Monk v. Danna, 110 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
139. 614 S.W.2d at 629.
140. 618 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
141. Id at 923.
142. 612 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Id at 620-21.
144. Id at 622. See Davis v. Congregation Shearith Israel, 283 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dalas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. 617 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
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division and thus was not subject to the declaration of restrictions only
pertaining to the subdivision. 46
Condominiums. In Scott v. Williams 147 the plaintiffs, owners of apartments
in a condominium regime established pursuant to the Texas Condomin-
ium Act,148 sued other apartment owners who also served as members of
the board of administration, alleging that the defendants had controlled
the condominium regime for their own gain and had mismanaged its af-
fairs and funds. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction against
future mismanagement or misapplication of funds. Not all of the apart-
ment owners were parties to the suit, although the plaintiffs alleged that
the suit was brought for themselves individually and as equitable repre-
sentatives of the other co-owners. Reasoning that a condominium regime
results in two distinct real property interests in each owner-his individual
apartment which is owned in fee, and his undivided interest in the com-
mon elements, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for
damages on behalf of other co-owners, because the owner of one estate in
severalty cannot sue for the owner of a separate parcel, whether the suit be
for title or damages, and one co-tenant normally cannot sue for damage to
common property without the joinder of all co-tenants.149 The court held
that the plaintiffs did, however, have standing to represent their co-tenants
in obtaining an injunction to protect and preserve the common
property.' 50
Disputes between Adjoining Landowners. Carrion v. Singley 15 1 was a suit
for injunction to require the defendant to repair or replace a retaining wall
on his land which provided lateral support for the plaintiff's property. The
court held that the right of lateral support applies only to land in its natu-
ral state.' 52 Because both the plaintiff's and the defendant's lots had been
excavated, terraced, and filled above the natural grade by the developer,
the defendant had no duty to maintain the retaining wall on his land to
provide lateral support to the plaintiff's land. 153
Wingfield v. Bryant' 54 involved loss of lateral support due to excavation
on adjacent land and trespass on plaintiff's land by going upon it and
dumping debris. The court held that before recovery may be permitted for
loss of lateral support, a party must show that his land has been injured. 1 55
The requirement for proof of injury to the land was met by evidence of a
146. Id at 283-84.
147. 607 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980).
149. 607 S.W.2d at 270-71.
150. Id at 271-72.
151. 614 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Id at 917. See, e.g., Williams v. Thompson, 152 Tex. 270, 277-78, 256 S.W.2d 399,
403 (1953).
153. 614 S.W.2d at 917.
154. 614 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Id at 645.
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depression on plaintiff's property which was fifty to seventy-five feet in
diameter and twenty-five feet deep caused by the excavation on the adja-
cent land.' 56 On the issue of trespass, the court held that the award of
$12,360.00, the amount the jury found as the cost of removing the debris,
was a proper measure of damages as the cost in restoring the land to its
former condition.' 57
In Gardner Y. Ker/y158 the defendant went onto his neighbor's lot and
removed a barbed wire fence adjacent to the rear of the property. Al-
though the plaintiff had been callous in erecting the fence along the prop-
erty line next to a residential subdivision and letting the fence remain after
he became aware of injuries to four children playing near it, the defendant
did not have the right to trespass on or destroy the plaintiff's property.'
59
The court concluded from the evidence that the defendant's act of trespass
was wilfull and intentional, and therefore supported an award of exem-
plary damages.' 60
Community Properties, Inc. v. Neely 16 1 involved the plaintiffs' claim for
damages resulting from the construction of an apartment complex on adja-
cent land owned by the defendant. The project diverted the natural flow
of surface water and flooded the plaintiffs' property. The proof showed
that flooding occurred when rainstorms washed out the defendants' drain-
age and water retention facilities and that the overflow could be abated by
construction of storm sewer facilities. The trial court entered judgment on
the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiffs $40,000 in damages for "perma-
nent" injury based upon the difference in market value before and after
the flooding.' 62 The plaintiffs also were awarded damages for personal
discomfort, inconvenience, and annoyance, based on a finding that the de-
fendants acted with malice in failing to take adequate action to prevent the
condition from recurring.' 63
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded the part of the judg-
ment awarding damages for permanent injury, concluding that the injuries
to the plaintiffs' property were temporary rather than permanent because
the flooding occurred sporadically and could be terminated by the con-
struction of an underground storm sewer.64 The court also noted that the
injury was of such a nature that the defendants could have been enjoined
from diverting the flow of water.165 The court upheld and rendered judg-
156. Id
157. Id at 646.
158. 613 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
159. Id. at 796.
160. Id
161. 611 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ granted).
162. See id at 949.
163. Id
164. Id at 951. 0
165. Id at 950-51, based upon the rules of law discussed in Kraft v. Langford, 565
S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978), in which the court stated:
Permanent injuries are those which are constant and continuous, not intermit-
tent or recurrent. Alas Chemical Industries, Inc. Y. Anderson, [524 S.W.2d 681
(Tex. 1975)]. Temporary injuries are those which are not continuous but are
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ment for the plaintiffs on the award of damages for personal discomfort
and annoyance, which was not challenged, noting that such recovery is
allowed whether the nuisance is temporary or permanent. 166 The award of
exemplary damages was reversed and judgment was rendered for the de-
fendants on the ground that neither negligence nor want of ordinary care
nor a mere unlawful act will subject the actor to exemplary damages. 167
The record did not show circumstances to support a finding of malice be-
cause the defendants had taken steps to remedy the situation after being
notified of the drainage onto the plaintiffs' land. 68
II. PURCHASES AND SALES OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Formation, Performance, and Interpretation of Contracts
Enforcement of Contracts. In Jones v. Kelley 169 the Supreme Court of
Texas ruled that four separate documents were to be construed together as
a single contract for the sale of a 127.55 acre tract of land and that the
description of the property in the four documents, when read together, was
sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. 170 The documents were the fol-
lowing: (a) an earnest money contract by which Mr. and Mrs. Jones
agreed to sell to Mr. and Mrs. Kelley "'36 acres out of the W.W. Wagstaff
Survey, A-796, in Shelby County, Texas,'" (b) an earnest money contract
in which the Joneses agreed to sell to the Kelleys "'91.55 Acres out of the
W.W. Wagstaff Survey A-796 and D.G. Green Survey A-263 in Shelby
County, Texas,'" and which contained a provision that the sale was to be
closed in conjunction with the 36 acre contract, (c) an application and con-
tract of sale for the Texas Veterans' Land Program providing, with refer-
ence to the 36 acre tract, for attachment by Jones of a field note description
of the property, and (d) a seller's affidavit for the Veterans Land Board of
Texas wherein Mr. and Mrs. Jones averred that they were the sellers of the
36 acre tract, which was purchased by them for $10,000 from C. Balsimo,
and that a surveyor's field note description for an access easement was
being furnished. 171 When the Joneses refused to convey the property, the
"sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain." Id An-
other characteristic of a temporary injury is the ability of a court of equity to
enjoin the injury causing activity. An injury which can be terminated cannot
be a permanent injury. The concepts of temporary and permanent injuries are
mutually exclusive and damages for both may not be recovered in the same
action. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Hutton, [58 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933,
holding approved)] at 21.
565 S.W.2d at 227.
166. 611 S.W.2d at 951-52.
167. Id at 952-53.
168. Id
169. 614 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1981).
170. Id at 98. The Texas Statute of Frauds provides that a contract for the sale of real
estate is not enforceable unless such agreement is in writing and signed by the person to be
charged with the agreement or by someone lawfully authorized to sign for him. TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
171. 614 S.W.2d at 97. The 36 acre contract was to be assigned by the Kelleys to the
Veterans Land Board of Texas, which would take title to the land and resell it to the Kelleys
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Kelleys sued for specific performance. After a jury trial, the court entered
judgment for the Kelleys, decreeing specific performance. The court of
civil appeals affirmed.' 72
The supreme court held that the parties clearly intended that the execu-
tion of the four documents was for the primary purpose of conveying the
entire 127.55 acres to the Kelleys; therefore, the four documents were to be
construed together as one contract. 173 Under Texas law, a statement of
ownership of property in a written contract and evidence showing that the
party owns only one tract of land answering the description is sufficient to
identify the land with reasonable certainty. 174 Here, the seller's affidavit to
the Veterans Land Board, one of the four documents constituting the con-
tract, recited that the Joneses were owners of the land conveyed by deed
from C. Balsimo to Jones, 175 and the jury found that the Joneses intended
to sell the entire tract, which was all of the land owned by them in Shelby
County. Moreover, at the time the contracts were signed, the 36 acres to be
conveyed to the Veterans Land Board had been chosen by the Joneses and
outlined, with calls for course and distance, on a plat of the entire tract. 1
76
Construing the instruments together, the court found the description of the
entire property sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.
177
A vigorous dissenting opinion stated that this was "a classic example of
what the Statute of Frauds was intended to prevent," as there were "two
contracts to convey two tracts of land to two purchasers with two deeds,
one to the [Veterans Land Board] and one to the Kelleys."' 178 According
to the dissent, the description of the 36 acres as part of a larger tract of
land was insufficient without an identification of the specific part of the
larger tract to be conveyed. The contract for the 36 acres, therefore, in the
dissent's view, was invalid for uncertainty of description.179 The contract
for $400 per acre in cash. The 91.55 acres were to be sold directly to the Kelleys for $400 per
acre with a cash payment of $5,493, and a note and deed of trust for the balance of the
purchase price.
172. Jones v. Kelley, 602 S.W.2d 573, 576-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), a t'd, 614
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1981).
173. 614 S.W.2d at 99. The court noted the general rule that separate instruments exe-
cuted "at the same time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction" are
to be read and construed together. Id at 98 (citing Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 341, 321
S.W.2d 62, 65 (1959); Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 348, 159 S.W.2d 472, 475 (1942);
Braniff Inv. Co. v. Robertson, 124 Tex. 524, 535, 81 S.W.2d 45, 50 (1935); Libby v. Noel, 581
S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
174. 614 S.W.2d at 99 (citing Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977); Pickett
v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 210, 223 S.W.2d 222, 224 (1949)). The court in Pickett stated:
The stated ownership of the property is in itself a matter of description which
leads to the certain identification of the property and brings the description
within the terms of the rule that "the writing must furnish within itself, or by
reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the par-
ticular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty."
Id (emphasis in original).
175. A metes and bounds description of the property was in evidence. 614 S.W.2d at 99.
176. Id at 99-100. The plat, which was in evidence, showed the 36 acres situated within
the larger 116 acre tract.
177. Id at 100.
178. Id at 101.
179. Id at 101-02.
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for conveyance of the 91.55 acre tract to the Kelleys, according to the dis-
senters, also was lacking for the same reason.180
In Vendig v. Traylor lsl the seller was the owner of two lots encumbered
by mortgages and posted for foreclosure on September 5, 1978. The buyer
contracted to purchase one lot, Lot 18B, on the condition that he obtain
financing by August 18, 1978, which later was changed in writing to Au-
gust 28. The buyer asserted a subsequent oral modification that extended
the time to September 1. When the buyer failed to obtain financing by
August 28, the seller sold both lots to another party before the September 5
foreclosure date. In a suit by the buyer for damages, one issue was
whether testimony of the oral agreement was barred by the statute of
frauds. The court stated that under Texas law "an oral modification of a
written contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds only if the
modification does not materially alter the obligations imposed by the un-
derlying agreement."' 8 2 Applying this rule, the court found that the Au-
gust 28 date was an integral and material part of the contract because the
buyer's failure to acquire financing by that date would allow the seller to
find another purchaser before the foreclosure sale.183 Thus, the oral modi-
fication extending the date to September 1 was unenforceable, and the
contract terminated by its express terms on August 28.184
A buyer was denied summary judgment in a suit for specific perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of real property in Chessher v. McNabb.185
To be entitled to specific performance, the buyer had to prove compliance
with all the terms of the contract.' 86 The contract in this case stipulated
that the buyer would assume the unpaid balance of an existing mortgage
loan and contained the following provision:
FINANCING CONDITIONS: If a Noteholder on assumption...
(iii) requires approval of Buyer or can accelerate the Note and Buyer
does not receive from the Noteholder written approval and accelera-
tion waiver prior to the Closing Date, Buyer may terminate this con-
tract. . .. Buyer shall apply for the approval and waiver under (iii)
above within 7 days from the effective date hereof and shall make
every reasonable effort to obtain the same.' 87
Because the record contained no evidence that the lender had approved
the purchaser as assumptor of the mortgage, the purchaser failed to sustain
the burden of showing that he was entitled to a judgment for specific per-
180. Id at 102.
181. 604 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
182. Id at 427 (emphasis in original) (citing Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ retd n.r.e.); Grayson Enter., Inc. v. Texas Key
Broadcasters, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ dism'd)). See
Dracopoulas v. Rachal, 411 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1967).
183. 604 S.W.2d at 428. In reaching its conclusion the court relied on the fact that the
property was posted for foreclosure on September 5, and the contract expressly provided
that it would be null and void if financing was not obtained by August 28. Id
184. Id
185. 619 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
186. Id at 421 (citing Bell v. Rudd, 144 Tex. 491, 497, 191 S.W.2d 841, 844 (1946)).
187. 619 S.W.2d at 421.
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formance as a matter of law. 188
An opposite result was reached by a different court of civil appeals in
Vordenbaum v. Rubin,189 in which the contract provision requiring the
noteholder's approval was identical to that of the Chessher case.190 The
sellers contended that the contract never was effective because the buyers
failed to apply for approval and waiver from the lender. The court dis-
agreed and affirmed a trial court judgment awarding specific performance
to the buyers because "the contract by its terms authorizes the buyers
rather than the sellers to terminate the contract for lack of approval by the
note holder."' 191 The provision requiring the buyers to apply for approval
and waiver within seven days was found to be a limitation to prevent buy-
ers from terminating in the absence of timely application and reasonable
efforts to obtain approval.1 92
The Vordenbaum case also dealt with the issue of whether a seller can
avoid specific performance of a contract because a note to be executed to
the seller would be usurious on its face. The court concluded that the sell-
ers could not avoid enforcement on that ground. 193 A usurious contract is
not wholly void and is enforceable if allowance is made for the statutory
penalty imposed by article 5069-1.06.194 In reaching its decision the
court also relied on the fact that the buyers had the right to waive the
usury and pay the note at any time. 195
In Advance Components, Inc. v. Goodstein 196 an option to purchase in a
lease provided for assumption of an outstanding mortgage debt, but the
purchaser was unable to assume the debt because the mortgagee bank re-
quired individual guaranties on the assumption. The purchaser arranged
financing for the entire price with another lender, and the seller refused to
close because of the purchaser's failure to assume the note. In a suit for
specific performance the trial court granted a summary judgment for the
seller, which was reversed and remanded by the court of civil appeals. 197
The appeals court first decided that the law governing bilateral contracts,
rather than the rule of strict compliance, was applicable to this case, be-
cause a bilateral contract was formed when the option was exercised.1 98
188. Id at 421-22.
189. 611 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
190. Chessher v. McNabb, 619 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ).
191. 611 S.W.2d at 464.
192. Id The court noted that any possible benefit derived from approval of the lender
would not justify the seller's terminating the contract. Id
193. Id. at 465.
194. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1982). 611 S.W.2d
at 465.
195. Id The court noted that the question of whether enforcement of a contract penalty
for a usurious rate can be compelled against a seller who desires to purge the transaction of
usury was not presented in the case. Id.
196. 608 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Id at 740. The trial court found that the buyer failed to comply with the terms of




Although the buyer did not strictly comply with the contract in that the
mortgage debt was to be paid off rather than assumed, the court found no
material breach of the contract.199 Thus, under the rule in Farris v. Ben-
nett's Executors,2°° the buyer still was entitled to specific performance. 201
Numerous other cases reported during the survey period involved en-
forcement or attempted enforcement of contracts for the sale of real prop-
erty. Arreguin v. Cantu affirmed a judgment for specific performance of a
lost contract because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain
jury findings that a written agreement had been entered into.202 In Odum
v. Sims the court applied the rule that a written option to purchase real
property may be accepted orally unless the option contains terms to the
contrary and, accordingly, granted specific performance to buyers who had
given oral notice of their desire to exercise the option.20 3 The contract in
Donahue v. Allen 2°4 was contained in a deed conveying a 45 acre tract of
land in which the sellers reserved 1.5 acres, which was to be sold to the
grantee for $2,400 when the grantors abandoned the 1.5 acre tract as their
homestead. After the grantors' interest terminated at their deaths, the
grantee's assignee tendered payment to the grantor's devisee in order to
purchase the property. The assignee brought suit for specific performance
of the contract of sale and was awarded the judgment, which was affirmed
on appeal.20 5 Under the test of Paramount Fire Insurance Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. 206 the court found both parties bound to perform
the terms of the agreement upon termination of the interest. 20 7 The agree-
ment thus constituted an enforceable contract of sale, rather than an op-
tion to be exercised by the grantors during their lives.208
Specific performance was also granted in Estate of Groin v. Sumner,20 9 a
case that involved a written agreement between a brother and sister who
each owned an undivided one-half interest in a tract of land. The agree-
ment granted the survivor the right to purchase the interest of the deceased
199. Id at 739-40. In determining the issue of materiality, the court relied on three of
the factors listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
200. 26 Tex. 568, 572 (1863).
201. 608 S.W.2d at 739. The court also held that if the seller pleaded and proved dam-
ages caused by the buyer's breach, the trial court might condition the decree of specific
performance on payment to the seller of reasonable compensation. Id
202. 609 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1980, no writ). The court stated
the rule that "the existence, execution and content of a lost instrument may be shown by
circumstantial evidence." Id at 639. The evidence relied on included the friendship be-
tween the buyer and seller, and the fact that the buyer paid the entire purchase price and
was in possession of the property continuously after the sale. Id at 640.
203. 609 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
204. 608 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
205. Id at 748.
206. In Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex.
1962) the supreme court held that where an instrument itself is designated a contract of sale
and its language is of sale and purchase, and where it does not require the vendor to accept
the sum forfeited in full settlement of the buyer's liabilities for default, the contract is one of
purchase and sale rather than an option.
207. 608 S.W.2d at 747.
208. Id at 748.
209. 604 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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sibling for $8,000. After the brother died intestate, the sister demanded
that the administratrix of his estate convey the one-half interest in the
property for the stipulated sum. When the administratrix refused to do so,
the sister filed suit seeking specific performance. In affirming the trial
court, the court of appeals rejected the estate's argument that the agree-
ment was not a valid contract and found that the agreement was "mutual,
certain, complete and based upon a valuable consideration. 2 10
Post-Sale Disputes. Land Title Co. v. FM Stigler, Inc.,21 involved the
sale of forty-three acres of land under an agreement giving the seller's
agent authority to subordinate the seller's lien on the buyer's deed of trust
in favor of a lien for construction and improvements. The buyer financed
the purchase through a loan that was secured by giving the lender a deed
of trust to the property. Prior to the loan, the agent executed an agreement
subordinating the seller's deed of trust lien to that of the lender. When the
buyer defaulted on the loan, the lender foreclosed and purchased the prop-
erty. After refusing to repudiate the sale, the seller filed suit to set aside
the foreclosure and establish priority of his lien over the lender's lien. The
Supreme Court of Texas held that the seller's refusal to tender back the
funds after learning of the source constituted ratification of the agent's
subordination agreement with the lender.212 Moreover, because ratifica-
tion includes the entire transaction, the seller could not affirm the loan, in
order to keep the funds paid, while disaffirming the lien subordination. 21 3
In Turberville v. Upper Valley Farms, Inc. the doctrine of merger by
deed prevented purchasers from recovering the agreed price per acre for
land with an allegedly defective title. 214 The buyers in that case discov-
ered after the closing date that they did not own a railroad right-of-way
that ran across the property purchased. Because the deed prepared by the
seller's attorney provided that the property was being conveyed subject to
a "'Railroad right-of-way of Missouri Pacific Railway Company crossing
said premises,' ",215 the court concluded that the seller knew of the right-of-
way, and the purchasers were on notice that a deficiency existed in the
acreage for which they had contracted. 216 Under these facts, neither mu-
tual nor unilateral mistake could be found to avoid the merger by deed
doctrine. 217 The court also rejected the buyers' allegation of fraudulent
misrepresentation by the seller.218
210. Id at 230.
211. 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1980).
212. Id at 757.
213. Id
214. 616 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ). Under the
doctrine of merger by deed, all prior written and oral transactions of the parties are merged
into the deed itself. Id
215. Id at 678-79.
216. Id at 679.
217. [d at 678-79.
218. Id at 679.
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Liability of Escrow Agents. The issue in Capital Title Co. v. Mahone2 19
concerned the burden of proof necessary to recover damages from an es-
crow agent who negligently fails to cash an earnest money check. The
earnest money contract provided that in the event of default by the pur-
chaser, the earnest money would be forfeited to the seller, who then would
pay one-half to the buyer's real estate broker. The earnest money check
for $30,500 was never cashed by the escrow agent. After the buyers de-
faulted, the sellers sued the escrow agent for $30,500, and the real estate
broker intervened seeking one-half. The court of civil appeals held that in
order to prove that negligence is a proximate cause of the damages in such
a case, the plaintiff must show "that the check or some part thereof would
have been collectible except for the breach of duty by the escrow agent. '220
Because the plaintiff in this case did not plead or prove that any part of the
amount represented by the check was collectible, judgment was rendered
for the defendant escrow agent.221
B. Representations and Warranties; Fraud
Turner v. Conrad222 was a suit for breach of implied warranties of fitness
and workmanlike performance brought by purchasers of a lot and refur-
bished home after the collapse of a brick retaining wall, constructed by the
seller before the sale as an improvement. Rejecting the plaintiffs' conten-
tions, the court concluded that their implied warranty theory was not ap-
plicable to this case because the article sold-the home-was "used. '223
Additionally, even if implied warranties were found, their effect would
have been negated by the express language in the sales contract that the
buyer accepted the property "as is."' 224 Finally, although noting the im-
plied warranties have been extended to the sale of new homes or struc-
tures, the court declined to extend such buyer protection to the present
situation in which a new ancillary improvement was conveyed with a used
principal structure. 225
C Brokers
Validity and Enforceability ofAgreementsfor Commissions. In Bayer v. Mc-
219. 619 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
220. Id. at 207. The court noted that this cause of action is comparable to attorney mal-
practice suits, in which the claimant has the burden of proving that (1) the attorney was
negligent, (2) the client would have been entitled to a judgment but for the negligence, and
(3) the amount of the judgment would have been collectible. Id
221. Id
222. 618 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. Id. at 852.
224. Id See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(c)(1) (Vernon 1968). The contract
provided that the buyer "accepts the Property in its present condition, subject only to lender
required repairs" and certain installations. An addendum provided that failure to inspect
would "be deemed a waiver of Buyer's inspection and repair rights and Buyer agrees to
accept Property in its present condition." Id
225 dat 853. See Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1981, no writ); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Dade226 the court held that even though the seller does not plead the stat-
ute of frauds as a defense, a broker seeking to recover a commission under
the Real Estate License Act 227 must prove a valid written agreement
describing the land with the same certainty as required in cases arising
under the statute of frauds and statutes of conveyances. 228 The broker in
this case claimed a commission because the owner failed to execute an
earnest money contract with a prospective purchaser, thus allegedly
breaching the listing agreement between the owner and the broker. The
court held that the deed was void because the description in the listing
agreement did not provide, either within itself or by reference to another
existing writing, a means for identifying the land with reasonable cer-
tainty. 229 The court also found that a substantial difference existed be-
tween the sale terms of the listing agreement and the earnest money
contract; therefore, the purchaser's proposal was merely a counteroffer that
the owner could refuse without incurring liability to pay a broker's
commission.230
Smith v. Knapp231 involved a sales transaction in which a broker, acting
under a written agreement to "'handle the sale, financing, or acquisition'"
of a business, introduced the seller and purchaser and conducted early ne-
gotiations between them.232 The seller and purchaser subsequently en-
tered into a sale through direct negotiations. The court held that the
broker's acts and the trial court's finding that the broker did not abandon
efforts to conclude the sale were sufficient to justify recovery of the com-
mission.233 The court also held that even though the broker acted through
his unlicensed sole proprietorship, he was entitled to the commission be-
cause he personally was licensed and had filed assumed name certificates
for the company.234
A broker and his salesmen were precluded from recovering commissions
226. 610 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1982). Section 20(b) of the
Act provides:
An action may not be brought in a court in this state for the recovery of a
commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agree-
ment on which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writ-
ing and signed by the party to be charged or signed by a person lawfully
authorized by him to sign it.
228. 610 S.W.2d at 172 (citing Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1968);
Tidwell v. Cheshier, 153 Tex. 194, 196, 265 S.W.2d 568, 569 (1954); O'Boyle v. DuBose-
Killeen Properties, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 273, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
229. 610 S.W.2d at 172 (citing Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152
(1945); Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 357, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935); Lawrence v. Barrow,
117 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1938, writ dism'd). The land was de-
scribed as "'50 acres, more or less, out of the John H. Callihan Survey .... .610 S.W.2d
at 172.
230. Id at 173.
231. 606 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
232. Id at 47.
233. Id at 47-48.
234. Id. at 48.
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in Southern Cross Industries, Inc. v. Martin. 35 The broker had failed to
inform the seller of a purchase offer by a third party and then had sought
to purchase the property himself and sell it to the same third party. When
the broker was unable to purchase the property, the owner sold it to the
third party, thus giving rise to claims for commissions by the broker and
his salesmen. The court held that because a fiduciary relationship exists
between the seller and broker, a conflict is created when the broker under-
takes to buy the property on his own behalf.2 36 The law requires the bro-
ker to disclose to the seller "all facts that would reasonably affect the
[seller's] judgment. 2 37 Thus, the failure to disclose the offer made by the
third party was a breach of the broker's fiduciary duty and precluded re-
covery of a commission by him or his salesmen.2 38
Licensing of Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen. Young v. Del Mar Homes,
Inc. 239 was a case of first impression in Texas with respect to interpretation
of the Real Estate Licensing Act of Texas.240 A real estate salesman who
had been employed by a builder sued to recover commissions earned on
sales under contracts he had obtained that closed after he left the builder's
employment. The trial court found that in order to recover under the Act,
a broker must plead that he is licensed and must produce a written agree-
ment for compensation.2 4 1 On appeal the plaintiff asserted that he was
exempt from these requirements under subsection 3(f) of the Act.2 42 In
reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that "subsection 3(f)
totally exempts the plaintiff from complying with any and all requirements
of art. 6573a, including §§ 20(a) and (b)."' 2 4 3 Consequently, neither a
Texas real estate license nor a written agreement for payment of commis-
sions was required to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment for the
commissions.
24 4
Several other cases concerning the licensing of real estate brokers were
decided during the survey period. In Smith v. Bidwell the defendant bro-
kers were found jointly and severally liable for negotiating the sale of real
235. 604 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. Id at 292 (citing Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The conflict stems from the fact that in his capacity as seller's
agent, the broker must seek the highest price possible, while as a purchaser he seeks the
lowest price possible. 604 S.W.2d at 292.
237. Id at 293 (citing Ramsey v. Gordon, 567 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1978, writ refd n.r.e.)).
238. 604 S.W.2d at 293. Cf Miteff v. Guardian Title Co., 612 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (accrual of sellei's liability to pay a broker's commission).
239. 608 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ. ref d n.r.e.).
240. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
241. 608 S.W.2d at 806. These requirements are set forth in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6573a §§ 20(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
242. Subsection 3(f) exempts "a salesperson employed by an owner in the sale of struc-
tures and land on which said structures are situated, provided such structures are erected by
the owner in the due course of his business." Id § 3(f).
243. 608 S.W.2d at 807 (emphasis in original). The court based its decision on the legis-
lative intent clearly expressed in the statute. Id
244. Id at 808.
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estate without a license. 245 An out-of-state broker was denied recovery of
a commission in Tower Ten, Ltd v. Real, Inc. because the person (who was
himself a licensed broker in Texas) who signed the listing agreement on
behalf of the seller did so only as the seller's representative. 246 The court
of appeals in Conrad v. Artha Garza Co. found that a corporation that
failed to show it had a broker's license could not recover a commission. 2
47
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. 248 the
purchasers of a house sued the seller's real estate agent for misrepresenta-
tion of the square footage. The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs
were "consumers" within section 17.45(4) of the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act, which defines a consumer as "an individ-
ual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." 249
The Supreme Court of Texas held that the plaintiffs satisfied both require-
ments for qualifying as consumers: they had acquired the goods by
purchase, and the goods purchased formed the basis of the complaint. 250
Furthermore, the court held that privity with the defendant is not neces-
sary for the plaintiff to qualify as a consumer.25' The purchasers, there-
fore, were entitled to recover treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees,
and costs under the Act.252
In Brunstetter v. Southern253 purchasers sued the listing broker of a
house alleging unlawful failure to disclose a structural defect in violation
of the Act. The court denied recovery because prior to trial the plaintiffs
had entered into settlements with other defendants in which they received
$5,000, more than three times their actual damages of $1,639.95.254 The
"credit rule" was held to bar any recovery against the defendant because
the plaintiffs had received full satisfaction of their claim.2 55
III. LEGISLATION
Several new laws affecting the areas covered by this article were enacted
by the 67th Texas Legislature during the survey period. Two pieces of
legislation that affect the preparation of deeds and other instruments per-
taining to real property are H.B. 196,256 effective January 1, 1982, and H.B.
428,257 effective August 31, 1981. H.B. 196 requires deeds and other docu-
245. 619 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
246. 619 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
247. 615 S.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
248. 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
249. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
250. 618 S.W.2d at 539.
251. Id at 540-41.
252. Id. In a case decided before Cameron, the court of civil appeals held that purchasers
of lots were "consumers" under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Manchac v. Pace, 608
S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
253. 619 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 559.
255. Id at 559-60.
256. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
257. Id art. 6607a.
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ments conveying an interest in real estate to contain a mailing address of
each grantee, either on the document or in a separate instrument signed by
a grantor or grantee and attached to the document. Failure to include an
address of each grantee does not affect the validity of the document, but a
document which does not contain the mailing address of each grantee may
be filed for record with the county clerk only upon payment of a penalty
filing i~c equal to.the greater of (1) twice the statutory filing fee for the
document or (2) $25.00.258 H.B. 428, which adds article 6607a, provides
for short torms of acknowledgement. The Act provides that the statutory
forms of acknowledgement may be altered as circumstances require and
that the use of other forms is not prevented by the authorization of the
statutory forms. Statutory forms are provided for a natural person acting
in his or her own right and by attorney-in-fact, a partnership acting by one
or more partners, a corporation, and a public officer, trustee, executor, ad-
ministrator, guardian or other representative. 259  Dedication of private
roads for public use in counties having a population of 50,000 or less ac-
cording to the last preceding federal census is affected by H.B. 1589,260
effective August 31, 1981. H.B. 1589 defines "dedication" as "the explicit,
written communication to the commissioners court of the county in which
the land is located of a voluntary grant of the use of a private road for
public purposes." A county is permitted to acquire a public interest in a
private road only by purchase, condemnation, dedication or adverse pos-
session. A public interest, once established, must be recorded in the
records of the commissioners court, and a person asserting any right, title
or interest in a road in which a public interest has been asserted may file
suit in the district court within two years after the notation of the public
interest in the road in the records of the commissioners court. Neither
verbal dedication nor intent to dedicate by overt act is sufficient to estab-
lish a public interest in a private road under the Act, and adverse posses-
sion will not be established by either the use of a private road by the public
with the owner's permission or by maintenance with public funds of a pri-
vate road in which no public interest has been recorded in the records of
the commissioners court.261
H.B. 838, effective August 31, 1981,262 amends the Natural Resources
Code, to permit the Commissioner of the General Land Office to cancel a
patent located in a block or system of surveys that is in conflict with senior
surveys in the same block or system, and to issue a corrected patent con-
forming to such block or system of surveys. In the event excess acreage
exists, a deed of acquitance is to be procured and issued simultaneously
with the correct patent. The act is not to affect adversely the rights of any
party in or entitled to possession of land affected by the Act, but merely
clarifies ownership as if the patent had been correctly issued on the date
258. Id art. 6626(b).
259. Id art. 6607a.
260. Id art. 6812h.
261. Id art. 6812h, §§ 1-6.
262. TEX. NAT. RESOURCES CODE ANN. § 51.250 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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the erroneous patent was issued.263
Replatting of existing subdivisions is affected by S.B. 767, effective April
22, 1981, which amends article 974a.26 The Act permits a replat or resub-
division of a plat, or a portion thereof, without vacation of the immediate
previous plat where the replat (1) is signed and acknowledged by the own-
ers of the property being resubdivided or replatted, (2) has been approved
by the City Planning Commission or other appropriate governing body
after a public hearing at which parties in interest and citizens have the
opportunity to be heard, and (3) does not alter, amend or remove any cov-
enants or restrictions. 265 Where any of the proposed area to be replatted
or resubdivided was limited, within the immediate preceding five years, to
residential use for not more than two residential units per lot, either by
zoning or deed restrictions, the Act also requires publication of the notice
of the City Planning Commission or other appropriate governing body,
hearing and written notice to owners of all lots in the immediate preceding
subdivision plat, or if the immediate preceding subdivision plat contained
more than 100 lots, notice to owners of lots located within 500 feet of the
lots which are sought to be replatted or resubdivided.266 Such notices are
to be given at least fifteen days in advance of the hearing. If twenty per-
cent or more of the owners to whom notice is required to be given file
written protest prior to or at the hearing, then the City Planning Commis-
sion or other appropriate governing body must require written approval of
662 percent of (1) the owners of all lots in such plat, or (2) the owners of
all lots within 500 feet of the property sought to be replatted if the immedi-
ate preceding plat contains more than 100 lots. In computing percentages
of ownership, each lot is equal regardless of size or number of owners, and
the owners of each lot are entitled to cast only one vote per lot.267 The Act
also permits amendments by amending plats signed by the applicants only
to correct errors in prior plats as specified in the Act. Finally, the Act
exempts from the platting requirements of article 974a "a tract of land that
is located entirely within an incorporated city or town having a population
of 5,000 or fewer persons, according to the most recent federal census, that
is divided into parts, all of which are larger than 2 acres, and that abuts
or otherwise attaches to any part of an aircraft runway. '268
Homeowners' associations may qualify as non-profit corporations which
are exempt from franchise tax under H.B. 189, effective May 1, 1982, pro-
viding that the corporate franchise tax shall not apply to a non-profit cor-
poration organized and operated primarily to obtain, manage, construct
and maintain the property in or of a condominium or residential real es-
tate development, voting control of which is vested in the owners of indi-
263. Id § 51.250(d).
264. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 974a, §§ IA, 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
265. Id § 5(b).
266. Id § 5(c).
267. Id § 5(c)(2).
268. Id § IA.
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vidual lots, residences, or residential units and not in the developer. 269
The Real Estate License Act was amended by S.B. 478,270 effective Au-
gust 31, 1981, providing for the registration and regulation of persons who
perform inspections for a buyer or seller of real property pursuant to the
provisions of any earnest money contract form approved by the Texas
Real Estate Commission, with the designation "Registered Real Estate In-
spector." The Act does not apply to electricians, plumbers, carpenters,
persons engaging in the business of structural pest control under the Texas
Structural Pest Control Act, or any other person who repairs, maintains or
inspects improvements to real property and does not hold himself or her-
self out to the public as being in the business of inspecting such improve-
ments pursuant to any earnest money contract form adopted by the Texas
Real Estate Commission. The Act also provides that it will be a deceptive
trade practice under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA)271 for any person required to register under the Act to per-
form an inspection pursuant to a written contract that does not contain a
statement in at least ten-point type above or adjacent to the signature of
the purchaser of the inspection advising the buyer of rights under the
DTPA in the form specified in the Act.
272
The Real Estate License Act was also amended by S.B. 484, effective
April 23, 1981, to provide a curriculum of "core real estate courses" re-
quired for licensure and to provide for increased requirements for appli-
cants for licensure as real estate brokers and salesmen of successfully
completed semester hours in core real estate courses or other courses of
study approved by the Texas Real Estate Commission as specified in the
Act.273
269. TEx. TAX CODE § 171.082 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
270. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1982). See note 227 supra.
271. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
272. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 18C (Vernon Supp. 1982).
273. Id §§ 7(a), (c), (d).
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